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ARGUMENT
I.

THE UTAH SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN BILANZICH REQUIRES
A REMAND ON THE ISSUE OF 4TTORNEY FEES
This Court's decision in Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 2007 UT 26, 160 P.3d 1041 (Utah

2007), thoroughly upended the analytic regime applied by the lower court and compels an
award of attorney fees to Defendants. Simply put, Bilanzich holds that, "Utah Code
section 78-27-56.5 grants the district court discretion to award attorney fees and costs to a
prevailing party if the writing that forms the basis of the lawsuit provides attorney fees
for at least one party." 2007 UT 26, ^ 1. There is no question that: a) Defendants were
the prevailing party below, having had all counts dismissed (R. 596-598, Plaintiffs.
Addendum ("PI. Add."). 2; R. 703-07, PL Add. 3; 2277-2279, PL Add. 7; R. 3733-3738,
PL Add. 8; R. 3999-4002, PL Add. 10); and b) that the parties' written contract clearly
provided attorney fees for at least one party. (R. 426, PL Add. 6).
In light of Bilanzich, it is of no moment that the fee-shifting provision of the
contract at issue used the language of "non-defaulting" party rather than "prevailing"
party. Rather, Bilanzich instructs that:
[T]he plain language of Utah Code section 78-27-56.5
provides that a court may award costs and attorney fees to a
prevailing party in a civil action if two main conditions are
met. First, the civil action must be "based upon any
promissory note, written contract, or other writing." And
second, "the provisions of the promissory note, written
contract, or other writing" must "allow at least one party to
recover attorney's fees."
Bilanzich, 2007 UT 26, Tf 14. Here, it is plain that Plaintiff sued on a written contract that
clearly allowed at least one party to recover attorney's fees. Thus, the trial court's focus

on the distinction between a "non-defaulting" party and a "prevailing" party is no longer
meaningful after Bilanzich}

In recognizing that trial courts "should award fees liberally

under Utah Code section 78-27-56.5," Bilanzich further directed that trial courts should
"also apply common sense principles in determining the prevailing party, if any." Id. at ^f
20 (emphasis added).

It is simply indisputable that Defendants, having obtained

judgment on every count in the First Amended Complaint, were the prevailing parties in
this action.
Plaintiffs efforts to circumvent the expansive fee-shifting analysis set out in
Bilanzich are easily exposed and provide no basis to affirm the trial court's ruling. First,
Plaintiff argues that Defendants failed to move for attorney fees pursuant to Section 7827-56.5 below and, therefore, cannot do so now. (Plaintiffs Reply Brief and Response to
Cross Appeal ("PL's Br.") at 27). Plaintiff misses the point, however, in two respects.
First, Defendants are not seeking attorney fees "pursuant to" the Utah statute-they are
1

Further to the point, Plaintiff contended that Defendants breached Plaintiffs
employment agreement by, among other things, terminating his employment based on
false allegations of unsatisfactory job performance and intentionally breaching the
promises and representations Defendants made to Plaintiff. (R. 74-77). Plaintiff sought
not only damages for Defendants' alleged breach of contract and related claims, but also
attorney fees. (R. 80 ^J 70). Had Plaintiff prevailed, he would certainly have claimedand would likely have been entitled to-attorney fees under the employment contract,
maintaining that Defendants had defaulted in their obligations to honor the terms of the
contract and their alleged representations related thereto. Plaintiffs argument in his
responsive brief that he did not sue Defendants for "defaulting" under the contract
engages in the type of word parsing that Bilanzich rejects. Even employing the trial
court's definition of the term "default"-"the omission or failure to perform a legal or
contractual duty," (R. 4434)-had Plaintiff prevailed he would surely have been a "nondefaulting" party. Once it is clear that the contract provides for the recovery of attorney
fees and costs by at least one party, Bilanzich confirms that any prevailing party is
entitled to such fees and costs.
2

seeking fees pursuant to the written contract between the parties. Second, the Utah
Supreme Court's broad interpretation of Section 78-27-56.5 was rendered after the
parties had briefed the issue of attorney fees before the trial court. Bilanzich* § broad
explication of Section 78-27-56.5 supplies further authority for the trial court to award
fees where otherwise provided for in a written contract.
Plaintiffs suggestion that Section 78-27-56.5 is inapplicable because Defendants
"had an equal right to fees under Section 7.3 of the SWC Agreement" sets the very trap
Bilanzich prohibits. PL's Br. at 27 n. 28. First, Section 78-27-56.5 applies where a
written contract allows "at least one party to recovery attorney's fees."

Thus, the

provision is applicable where a contract provides for attorney's fees to more than one
party. Second, had Plaintiff prevailed on his contract and related claims, he would have
effectively established that Defendants had defaulted on their contractual obligations.
Where the opposite occurred, however, and Defendants prevailed, Defendants did not
need to establish that Plaintiff had himself defaulted on his contractual duties in order to
be entitled to attorney's fees. Were that the case, the very asymmetric outcome that
Bilanzich rejected (if Plaintiff prevails he is entitled to fees, but if Defendants prevail
they are not) would hold sway.

2

Section 78-27-56.5 provides that, "A court may award costs and attorney's fees to
either party that prevails in a civil action based upon any promissory note, written
contract, or other writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the
promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one party to recover
attorney's fees." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56.5 (emphasis added).
Nor is Plaintiff accurate in suggesting that the trial court simply exercised its discretion
in denying Defendants their attorney fees. Rather, the trial court employed an analysis

3

Finally, Plaintiffs argument that attorney fees may not be awarded because
Defendant SWC's "unilateral termination of the SWC Agreement on May 12, 2000,
terminated all provisions of the Agreement, including the attorney fee and cost provision
in Section 7.3" cannot be taken seriously in the aftermath of Bilanzich. PL's Br. at 28. In
Bilanzich, the Supreme Court rejected the appellate court's reliance on the common law
rule that a party may not'" avoid [a] contract and, at the same time, claim the benefit of
the provision for attorney fees,'" and held that Section 78-27-56.5 allows an award of
attorney fees pursuant to a contract even where a party successfully claims the same
contract is unenforceable due to the failure of a condition precedent. 2007 UT 26,fflf8,
23. In the present case, there is not even a question of the contract's enforceability;
rather, Defendants merely terminated the employment of Plaintiff who was an at-will
employee.

Under Bilanzich, however, even if the contract itself were deemed

unenforceable (which it was not), the attorney fee provision would nonetheless survive.
II.

BILANZICH COMPELS A REMAND ON THE ISSUE OF COSTS; IN
ADDITION, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS ANALYSIS UNDER
RULE 54(D)
Plaintiff conspicuously ignores the dispositive impact of Bilanzich on the issue of

costs. For the reasons set forth in Section I above, Bilanzich's directive with respect to
Section 78-27-56.5 is equally applicable with regard to all of Defendants' costs incurred
in successfully defending all of Plaintiffs claims. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56.5
(referring to costs and attorney's fees).

This would permit the recovery of all of

that is inconsistent with the later decision in Bilanzich, thereby requiring remand for
proper evaluation.
4

Defendants' costs, not simply those provided under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d),
including the expert fees Defendants incurred in rebutting Plaintiffs expert's damages
model which exceeded $12 million.
With regard to Defendants' application for deposition costs under Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 54(d), Plaintiff attempts to mask the deficiencies of the trial court's
decision simply by restating that the governing standard is abuse of discretion. {See Pi's
Br. at 29). Plaintiff fails entirely to justify the unsubstantiated conclusions on which the
trial court relied in denying deposition costs. First, the trial court's ruling that "the case
was decided on legal grounds not factual issues" (R. 4457), is misleading in its purported
support for the finding that the length of Plaintiffs deposition was inessential for the
development of Defendants' case. To the contrary, uncovering the details of Plaintiff s
claims regarding the Defendants' alleged tortuous interference, defamation, and
fraudulent inducement claims was critical in exposing the legal deficiencies in Plaintiffs
various causes of action.

For example, the trial court's decision to grant summary

judgment on Count V (tortuous interference and defamation) was based on the absence of
facts supporting these claims. (R. 3733-3738).
Second, even if the trial court concluded that it was not essential to have devoted
the entire amount of time that Defendants did to Plaintiffs deposition, this does not
support the trial court's ruling that there was "no method to parse out what portion may
have been essential from the overall claim. . . ." (R. 4457). This is especially the case
where the trial court did not even offer Defendants an opportunity to make such a
showing.
5

Finally, the trial court literally ignored the need for Defendants to participate in the
depositions scheduled by Plaintiff.

To the extent that Plaintiff determined that these

witnesses had information supporting the claims in the First Amended Complaint, it was
imperative that Defendants attend these depositions and pose questions to the witnesses.
There is no basis to deny Defendants' costs in connection with the transcripts of these
deponents.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Defendants respectfully request that this Court
reverse the trial court's decision denying Defendants their costs and attorney fees and
grant Defendants their costs and fees incurred in this appeal.
DATED this 16th day of May, 2008.
HOLLAND & HART LLP
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Attorneys for Defendants Appellees and CrossAppellants
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